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This essay offers a critique of the controversial proposal that peculiarities in African thought 
concerning time have a negative impact upon African economic development. The proposal 
under scrutiny takes the form of two corollaries whose notoriety dates back to John S. Mbiti’s 
(1969) infamous claim that African cultures lack an indigenous concept of the distant future. 
It is shown that these joint hypotheses appear to be either self-refuting or false. In 
consequence, the proposal that a cross-cultural scrutiny of time will reveal defective concepts 
is reconsidered. It is proposed that deficiencies in the perception of time that bear a negative 
impact upon African economics are instead the cache of foreign experts who fail to 
appreciate conventional uses of time in Africa as rtional strategies for risk avoidance, 
damage control, for resisting hegemonic authority, quelling foreign expropriation of African 
resources, and for maximizing efficiency given scarce capital and inadequate infrastructure. 
What begins as a deflationary dismissal of a long-standing debate over African indigenous 
thoughts about time concludes with a promising speculation about African idiosyncratic 




African concepts of time, cultural relativism, economic development, John S. Mbiti, post-
colonial hermeneutics, time management 
 
Introduction 
In the mid 1990s, two consecutive intercultural symposia were organised2 to pursue a heated 
controversy about culture-specific metaphysics thathas persisted for nearly half a century, 
ever since remarkable claims about a uniquely African oncept of time were first published 
                                                 
2  Contrasts were drawn in the first symposium betwen the notions of time within as well as outside th 
Western philosophical tradition since Aristotle, St. Augustine, as proposed by Hegel, secularized by Marx, 
critiqued later by Heidegger, and later still by Derrida and Lyotard (Kimmerle 1996, 11-24; Tiemersma 1996, 
16). Proceedings of both conferences were published by Rodopi (1996, 1998). 
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by John S. Mbiti (1969) in African Religions and Philosophy. (A brief review of Mbiti’s 
posits will shortly be sketched in section 1). The first of these symposia, “Time and 
Temporality in Intercultural Perspective”, presented scholarship elaborating this hypothesis: 
(i) there exist culture-specific differences in beliefs about time, particularly regarding the 
future as a distinct dimension. (In the course of this critique I will refer to this as the culture-
specificity hypothesis.) At the second symposium, “The Concept of Time and Perception of 
Development in sub-Saharan Africa”, the main hypothesis under consideration was this: (ii) 
radically distinct, culture-specific beliefs about time contribute causally to the different paces 
of economic development experienced in Africa and in G-8 countries.3 (Hereafter I refer to 
this claim simply as the causal hypothesis.) The purpose of this paper is to spell out why 
these two hypotheses are jointly unsustainable, especially when they are proposed in the 
context of an intercultural forum. 
 
Organisers of these symposia were keenly sensitive to the impact of physical setting, social 
environment and political history upon intercultural inquiry, so the venue of the second 
symposium was shifted from Western Europe to Dakar in Senegal.4 It was hoped that the 
gestalt of underdevelopment experienced and processed in a cosmopolitan centre of West 
Africa’s multiple language communities and social milieus would reinforce reflections on the 
symposium’s theme. 5 
 
In this critique I will draw upon staple criticisms of radical relativist theses of all kinds 
(Davidson 1975, Lauer 2007a, 2009, Williams 1972, 35); and I will apply general results 
harvested from the philosophy of intentional action (Davidson 1963). In Section 1, I will 
present Mbiti’s notorious postulates about a stark contrast between African and Western 
concepts of time, and samples of the sorts of questions that his work still inspires decades 
later, questions that presuppose the same hypotheses (i) and (ii) stated above. Section 2 will 
explore the cogency of (ii) - the causal hypothesis - by considering whether it is warranted to 
                                                 
3 For the sake of systematic analysis, it is necessary to bracket all but a few of the question begging ambiguities 
presumed by hypotheses (i) and (ii) under consideration; so I artificially restrict the denotation of ‘Western’ 
by using this cluster term ‘G-8’ to refer to Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
4 The second conference was sponsored by the Goethe Institute and Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Dakar 
Senegal, May 22-25, 1996. 
5 Heinz Kimmerle, conference organiser, in private conversation June 1995, University of Ghana, Legon. 
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pick out metaphysical beliefs as essential to the things people do intentionally. According to a 
strict reading of this causal hypothesis, the regressiv  and stagnant economic conditions 
prevailing in Africa cannot be improved without some change occurring in African 
propositional attitudes towards time. In order to assess this hypothesis, it is necessary to 
consider the pitfalls of presuming to know which particular thoughts may have contributed to 
improving or undermining economic conditions by causing a particular action on a given 
occasion (Lauer 1992; 2009). Section 3 will address problems with (i) - the culture-specificity 
hypothesis - which asserts that a person’s beliefs about time will be determined by the 
linguistic and cultural influences the individual is exposed to while growing up. Like 
relativist theses generally, this claim is vulnerable to the threat of triviality or incoherence 
depending upon how it is interpreted (Williams 1972, 31-36), and these errors of 
interpretation require sorting out before the overall cogency of these corollaries can be 
assessed. The results of sections 2 and 3 demonstrate that it is philosophically idle to isolate 
out of the mix of thoughts that result in an economic success or failure, just those 
propositional beliefs about a phenomenon called ‘time’. It will be shown in section 4 that the 
beliefs about time that are most relevant to African development economics are best 
understood as referring elliptically to particular social relations, contingent circumstances and 
historical norms that actually do motivate people’s reactions to their changing material 
condition and their efforts to reform or allay it. Therefore, section 4 will reassess cross-
cultural misconceptions about time in relation to perceptions of development; but now the 
onus will be upon shortfalls in perceiving and appreciating from a distance how time 
management functions in Africa as a range of strategies for coping with economic 
underdevelopment. 
 
The analysis will have revealed that it is not the concept of time as a metaphysical entity, 
force, or phenomenon variously interpreted which is pertinent to development economics. 
Rather, time is pertinent to development as a social dimension, as a tool for reinforcing 
political relations, for apportioning social goods and for managing intractable difficulties in 
situations of extreme scarcity and inadequate infrastructure. In these ways time emerges as 
instrumental in Africans’ mastery over economic disarray. This interpretation is not hard to 
appreciate. Yet rigorous debate over ascriptions of congenitally dysfunctional belief systems 
to African knowledge traditions has remained a philosophically durable exercise, an 
intellectual complement to the history of capital ventures and global alliances dubbed 
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‘international partnerships for development’.6 So the question arises: why does the neo-
colonial environment of globalisation encourage andperpetuate lively deliberation over such 
a logically flawed approach to understanding and correcting African ‘underdevelopment’? In 
response to this hermeneutic challenge, I will try to show in section 5 why an intercultural 
philosophical debate explicitly concerned with the content of beliefs about the 
phenomenology of time may be implicitly a conflict about control over its use. 
 
§1. Exoticising African concepts of time 
John Mbiti’s widely read African Religions and Philosophy (1969) is usually cited as the 
source of controversy over isolating traditional African descriptions of time from those 
featured in Western philosophical traditions.7 In the seminal sections [g] and [h] of chapter 3 
in his classic book (1969, 26-28), Mbiti posited that Africans think about time chiefly in “two 
dimensions” with reference to an inchoate limitless pa t and a sedentary, concrete present. He 
proposed that African expressions diverge radically from common ‘Western’ referrals to time 
which is in three dimensions: a traceable historic past nesting neatly into metric aggregates by 
year, decade, century, and millennia, then the instantaneous present, and finally a limitless, 
abstract and infinitely receding future. On Mbiti’s view, African notions of the future are 
limited to concrete repetitions or extensions of observable events, directly related to known 
cycles of nature and foreseeable outcomes of immediate human concerns and projects such as 
harvesting fruit trees, parenting, and kinship obligations. 
 
Mbiti posited that Western notions of the distant future were “discovered by Africans” in 
modernity only through exposure to colonial missionaries’ linguistic habits and Christian 
eschatology. Mbiti was aware of the outraged reception of his claims (1969, 28); and he 
challenged his critics to provide counterexamples from non-Bantu African language 
                                                 
6 The final Millennium Development Goal number 8 prescribes such relationships to encourage African 
governments to create legislature and ‘enabling enviro ments’ favouring foreign investment. In Ghana this 
takes the form of exclusive tax shelters for foreign entrepreneurs, coping with gross imbalances in terms of 
world trade, selling off natural resources, an absence of national unemployment statistics, disabling 
centralized trade union power, trivializing labour rights, legislating procurement regulations that favour 
foreign bidders, undermining competitiveness of small and medium size businesses, tolerating a bloated 
informalised commercial sector (Ninsin 2012). 
7 Wiredu (1996, 26), Hallen (2009, 26), Kimmerle (1997).  
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communities.8 Mbiti was unabashed in urging that an understanding of all aspects of African 
life, from worship rituals to work habits and leisure, depended upon appreciating the African 
truncated sense of the future. He predicted that prctices inherent to successful capital 
investment, long term economic planning, habits of saving and delaying rewards, 
maintenance culture, and expanding educational institutions all depend upon individuals 
grasping the ‘Western’ notion of the future as a remote linear sequence of equal components 
projecting ahead indefinitely and without limit. He anticipated that Africans’ management of 
the transition and adaptation to a “new dimension of the future” would “not be smooth” and 
that the radical divergence between African and modern notions of the future “may well be at 
the root of, among other things, the political instability of our nations” (Mbiti 1969, 27). 
 
Three decades after Mbiti’s disconcerting interventions, the following discussion questions 
were designed to guide the Dakar 1996 symposium in order to test, to challenge, to question, 
to enhance and generally to bring Mbiti’s views up to date, as articulated by the symposium’s 
chief organiser, philosopher Heinz Kimmerle (1998, 22-24): 
• Might Africans with their concrete sense of time be able to counter the negative 
influences of development planning generic to capitalist economies, in particular the 
infamous delusion that technological innovations have infinite power to fuel progress 
in a linear trajectory toward an unreachable horizon of limitless growth? 
• Can the African conceptualisation of time as a concrete continuity between the past, 
present and foreseeable future correct against the historical mistakes of Western 
industrialists such as the notorious disregard for the delicate ecological balance of the 
environment? 
• “How can African thought open itself more effectively for the Western concept of 
time?” (Kimmerle 1998, 24). 
• Can Africans “learn to concentrate on regular work habits and exact ways of long 
term planning” which correlate historically with West rn conceptions of time as an 
infinite “sequence of equal elements”?  (Kimmerle 1998, 27)   
A rich literature already exists which exposes in meticulous detail the Eurocentric bias that 
pervades such segments of the Western philosophical canon as this, where Africa is featured 
in modernity (Serequeberhan 1997). I will not recap those compelling insights here. Instead 
                                                 
8 Barry Hallen (2009, 26 n.5) has observed that Mbiti’s evidence was supported with expressions collected from 
Kikamba and Gikuyu speakers. 
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the present essay will show that the framing of these questions is problematic insofar as they 
presuppose - no less than Mbiti’s generic claims presupposed forty-five years ago - joint 
subscription to the causal hypothesis and the culture-specificity hypothesis. It is not hard to 
show that these underlying corollaries are irreparably misguided, as I will next attempt to do. 
 
§2. Attributing causal power to beliefs about time 
I hope it is obvious why our analysis of the causal hypothesis requires focusing rather closely 
on the structure of intentions, that is, the clusters of thought presumed to be directly related to 
actions. This is simply because when we speak of the initiatives, projects, institutional 
arrangements and resource distribution that go into developing an economy and improving 
living standards, we are speaking of human intentional actions - usually interpersonal, 
orchestrated activities (Lauer 1997, 32). As to the actual make-up of an intention regarded as 
the reason for an action, there is no need here to r view the literature concerned with whether 
beliefs (along with other propositional attitudes such as desire and/or duty) can count among 
the members of causal networks or sequences that constitute actions done intentionally 
(Davidson 1963). We can suppose, for the sake of argument, that our thoughts do contribute 
in some way or other to the causes of our actions. It does not matter to the argument here; 
what is presented in this section applies to the primary reason for an agent’s behaviour, even 
if primary reasons are construed as non-causally related to the actions they explain. 
 
There is still a more salient problem concerning the causal hypothesis under scrutiny, and that 
is the difficulty involved in identifying which beliefs are the necessary or sufficient 
antecedents for a given action on a particular occasion. For this causal hypothesis stipulates 
that it is our beliefs about time, in particular, that are responsible above all others for the 
actions that promote or impede implementation of sustainable development policies. But this 
is implausible. For clearly, on a given occasion when we are intending to do something which 
is likely to have economic consequences, or when we are actually engaged in any such 
activity, the contents of our thoughts do not readily imply any definite formulation about the 
structure or nature of time. If asked about what we believe time to be like, our individual 
reports will vary with each of our individual abilities to articulate or discern the sporadic flow 
of images and impressions that may sometimes accompany our reasoning about what to do. 
Such reports may reflect learned ways of expressing beliefs about time, or they may reflect 
the influence of learned myths or dogmas to which we have been exposed at any stage of our 
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educational, religious, social or family life. But whether reports about time’s structure issue 
from the stream of immediate inner impressions itself or from learned phraseology, such 
reports are not a reliably definitive source of information about whether anyone’s time-
related thoughts are necessarily connected to other kinds of mental states and occurrences 
that are causally functional when he or she is making decisions and acting intentionally. The 
point here is not that some people may be incapable of formulating a clear image or statement 
about their experience of time or of their inner feelings and intuitions about its dimensions or 
qualities. The point is rather that even if Raj is skilled at articulating his beliefs about time, it 
does not follow that we have been provided evidence that such beliefs must have entered into 
the primary reason for his action. From such reports we may not correctly infer that Raj has 
provided us insight into the real reasons for his own time-related activities and intentions. 
Knowing how to read a road map does not make one a geologist. 
 
Of course this intractable difficulty in determining which beliefs have led a person to pursue 
a particular line of action is insufficient in itself to defeat the causal hypothesis. The problem 
is that from the sort of evidence one can expect to be available, there is no reason to suppose 
that the thoughts driving our behaviour, or that portion of behaviour that affects the economy, 
need entail any beliefs about the phenomenon of time per se. To understand why we do the 
things we do in our everyday lives - if you like, ‘in real time’ - we must focus instead, or as 
well, on the social conventions and norms that characte ise our uses of time within our social 
milieu. The allocation of disposable wealth, resources, opportunities and political influences 
determine the way time is spent in a given culture. All these are inseparable components of a 
coherent social structure, and these features of human interaction affect the pace of economic 
growth or stagnation, as the case may be. Beliefs which feature time as a referent of 
description need never enter in. They might be involved, but they need not be; and that is all 
that is wrong with the causal hypothesis, but it is enough to defeat it. There is at root the 
holism of belief to contend with here, since the fact that beliefs cannot be isolated neatly from 
one another defies the causal hypothesis from being t stable. Even if our notions of time were 
always causally present in any action we take affecting the economy, we would never know 
it. One could just as well postulate that since our diverse beliefs about God are ever present, 
they are thereby causally responsible for the economy. This is why I suggested that the causal 
hypothesis is an idle one. 
 
African and non-African time: to contrast or not to contrast? The geo-political convenience of dichotomization 9 
 9
From what little is known about the way that social roles and structures are sustained, there is 
no reason to hold the view that beliefs about the pnomenology of time as such are essential 
components of such processes, even when social roles and institutional arrangements in a 
community are defined and reinforced through time-ori nted behaviour. For example, when a 
West African characteristically comes to meet a social obligation an hour late, the significant 
thoughts and attitudes comprising his reason are likely to be about the people he is coming to 
meet and his purpose in meeting them. Non-discursive statements about such concerns can be 
made by executing persistently late arrivals. Nevertheless, it is not apparent why one should 
assume that a belief about time itself necessarily enters into the intention of someone engaged 
in making such demonstrations through their actions (contra Dayo Oluyemi-Kusa 1997, 166-
167).9 Statements can be made non-verbally through many such responses to time constraints. 
But none of those non-discursive demonstrations need to be reflecting beliefs about the 
phenomenon of time itself. What matters or occurs to the agent is likely to be the dynamics of 
the particular social situation, and customary beliefs about the significance of waiting for 
others or being waited for by others. Further, such beliefs are context-dependent upon a 
myriad of variables. Neither the structure of reasoning, nor the content of the thoughts 
involved in a late arrival are fixed a priori.  
 
Further still, such beliefs may not be propositional: I need not be able to explicitly formulate 
any beliefs or opinions at all about the utility or the significance of my choice or about the 
consequences of arriving late. Customary signals using time-related behaviour may depend 
upon following social norms. Norm-following in turn is not clearly the direct effect of any 
fixed set of articulable beliefs. In any case, even when prior deliberation is involved, time-
related decisions may entail no specifiable thoughts about time itself. In a situation where I 
can choose to sabotage or to conform to a new work p licy by a persistently delayed arrival, 
my choice of response will be impelled by my relation to the one imposing the suggestion, 
my group’s apparent consensus regarding what to do, the purpose of frustrating management, 
not about the nature of time as a phenomenon. Hypotheses connecting beliefs about time to 
the relevant aspects of the social world may featur in a third party’s analysis of my 
                                                 
9  Dayo Oluyemi-Kusa (1997, 167) regards the Nigerian co vention of late arrival as indicative of a “cyclic” 
conception of time. He associates “linear” time with Western conceptions of democracy, high literacy, 
conditions of political stability and the absence of military interruption of social institutions, and with a 
“viable industrial base”. 
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behaviour, while overlooking the proximate and wholly contingent considerations that are 
directing my concerns as an agent, and constituting my real reason for coming late. In large 
measure these concerns may involve my relations with other people as much as they reflect 
desired outcomes and future consequences. Or they may not - there is no telling exactly. That 
is the burden placed on the causal hypothesis by the holism of beliefs typically comprising 
our intentions. 
 
Further, in order for my concerns to exhibit rational agency, there is no requirement that I be 
motivated by beliefs explicitly applying a general principle or policy about time to a 
particular instance where my actions reveal I am cons ious of time - as is the case when I 
persistently arrive late to work. People act rationally when they are just following the time-
oriented conventions expected in a given situation, or when they make choices in accord with 
other people’s interests and convictions, or when they do things in order to assert a certain 
kind of identity or allegiance or influence or control or resistance. 
 
People acting rationally often just want to convey a certain image or to seek group approval 
or to maintain respect. Consider preferences among successful elites in Ghana, as described 
independently by Dowse (1973) and by Hagan (1992). The norm for maximizing security 
directs one to build many houses, expand farms, to accrue social capital: invest in several 
wives, foster many children and support many part-time labourers; retain funds to sponsor as 
many legal, social and religious functions as an unanticipated occasion may call upon one to 
sponsor for one’s communit(ies). This risk-avoidance policy is certainly contrary to the 
financial-capitalist’s strategy of maximizing profit potentials by streamlining expendable 
costs. On this image of a successful man there is no logical rationale for minimizing social 
obligations in order to sustain regular pulse-feeding of high risk investments invisibly hidden 
in stocks, bonds and futures, with expected delay of returns. The West African businessman’s 
behaviour may suggest an absence of thoughts overly concerned about the distant future, but 
his intentional choices and behaviour cannot be disassociated from thoughts about the 
impression being made upon esteemed cohorts and kin. 
 
Notice three important features of this last contrast. First, it captures two conceptions of 
success, not of time. Two ‘big’ men of different socio-economic cultures may be organizing 
their time and future plans explicitly. But they don t do so on the basis of different beliefs 
they could express about time or about the future; rather they base their decisions on different 
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images or models of success. The rationale underlying these different models might be 
available to each man for his independent scrutiny. One may come to realize that his inherited 
notion of a limitless future, his illusion of his own immortality and independence of others, 
falsely rationalizes his frugality and investment practices. But it does not follow from this 
realization that the man will thereby change his investment practices, nor does it follow that 
he would be rational in doing so. Barring extraordinar ly compelling circumstances, a man’s 
policy of resource and time management will change rather because he senses that the norms 
of success have changed - that a new image has emerg d in the minds of his cohorts 
concerning what is proper for a successful man to do. 
 
Secondly, the cultural norms that a man follows - unwittingly or self-consciously - do not 
absolutely determine as a matter of fixed consequence what he will choose to do, nor can 
they prescribe how a person will interpret a given immediate experience. Following a cultural 
norm does not entail any specifiable commitments of the individual in his fund of personal 
beliefs - beyond holding to a general policy of behaviour that fulfils to some degree the 
cultural image or model of how a ‘big’ and successful man behaves. 
 
Thirdly and conversely, there is no definite, specifiable set of beliefs or convictions about 
relevant matters of fact or of metaphysics entailed by adhering in practice to conventional 
images of success or to any social norm. The recall of personal experiences and the 
application of deep convictions remain the individual’s own affair no matter how much of a 
conformist he may be. Although following a norm entails acting in accord with a pattern 
prescribed as the normal way for a ‘big’ man to behave, there is nothing prescribed or 
compulsory about the fact that he holds to the norm. He could switch his style. In doing so he 
might be adopting a new policy of behaviour, perhaps following a different, contrary norm of 
another culture. 
 
Pointing out that people are free to move in and out of different social traditions by their own 
whim of course does not imply that it is obvious how social norms function to produce 
behavioural effects. Nor does emphasis on norm following imply that people may not also - 
perhaps always - carry propositional beliefs and reasons of their own about what they are 
doing or prefer to be doing, and why - even while th y are following social norms. Norm 
following is not presented here as an antithesis or contradiction to the claim that propositional 
beliefs - about time and many other things - may play a causal role in the things we do. The 
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point here is this: there is no evidence to suggest that the intentions leading to one form of 
behaviour rather than another must entail beliefs about the nature or structure of time itself, 
even when the behaviour explicitly involves the useof time. We can be trained to become 
sensitive to our impressions and thoughts about time. But even if we were all perfect at 
recounting our beliefs about the phenomena of time, th re are many situations where an 
individual may be concerned or worried or anxiously thinking about something in the past, or 
future, or in the present about a project for which the time is ‘running out’, yet not be 
harbouring beliefs about the structure or flow or movement of time as such, explicitly or 
implicitly. Consider the fact that you can worry (or, alternatively, be utterly nonchalant) 
about when your contractor will complete a new office building under construction, or you 
can worry about when the next rain or funding allotment will come, with or without any 
accompanying beliefs or images depicting time in any way. One can sustain time-related 
anxieties (or, contrarily, attitudes of indifferenc) with or without holding beliefs about time 
itself, either as flowing irreversibly forward or as expanding toward a point of fruition when 
the expected outcome finally occurs. Upon reflection, your anxious thoughts (or their 
absence) in such cases could be reconstructed either as being about time; or they may boil 
down to more specifically defined worries about the leasing dates on a particular building, or 
the germination of a newly planted crop on a particular field, or the arrival of specific 
chemicals to continue a given experiment, or the work still required to complete a difficult 
paper against a publication deadline. Clearly the contents of our thoughts on any of these 
topics do not necessarily imply our believing any definite formulation about the structure of 
time per se - not even a formulation which could be predicted by knowing our cultural 
background. This last point leads to the analysis of corollary (i) - the culture-specificity 
hypothesis - in the next section. 
 
To summarize the results of the discussion so far: conventions and norms in the use of time, 
along with the allocation of expendable wealth, social resources and opportunities, are 
inseparable components of our institutional structures and political relations. Among the 
other things we do with time, we use it to expand atraverse social spaces. It is important 
for my argument to stress that the way dimensions of time define and sustain social roles and 
status is not by means of our beliefs about empirical phenomena or metaphysical reality. It is 
rather the norms that people follow - their beliefs about what is the right or the normal or 
expected thing to do - which often determine people’s r ceptivity, their adaptability, or their 
resistance to changes they encounter in their material conditions. Some of us may well hold 
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to beliefs about time which influence the way we usit. But we need not do so. The bad news 
for the causal hypothesis is that it seems impossible to systematically isolate any beliefs 
according to their stereotypical content, to determine which ones are causally responsible for 
time-related behaviour on a specific occasion. Yet for the causal hypothesis not to be idle, it 
requires that we have a capacity to identify beliefs about time as causally or inferentially 
connected to a person’s actions. And from the considerations compassed so far, there appears 
to be no systematic warrant for identifying a particular type of belief, whose content 
describes or displays the nature or structure or passage of time itself, as responsible for 
making a significant impact on specific actions that determine the pace of African economic 
development. 
 
§3. Vagaries of conceptual relativism 
According to the culture-specificity hypothesis concerning beliefs about time, people growing 
up in Africa and people raised in ‘the West’ carry divergent primary concepts of time. 
Viewed in this way, the culture-specificity hypothesis is the converse of the causal hypothesis 
just canvassed in section §2. There it was supposed that individuals’ beliefs about time 
determine the material conditions in which those individuals reside, communicate, and 
conduct their economic affairs. Here, the culture-sp cificity corollary asserts that those very 
conditions in which people collectively reside, communicate, and raise their children, 
determine how they will think about time. It is the task of this section to show why these two 
posits cannot be sustained in tandem without appearing inconsistent, incoherent or trivial. 
 
One question which arises when assessing these joint hypotheses is the following: which of 
an individual’s beliefs is it warranted to regard as culturally idiosyncratic? Presumably if the 
causal hypothesis is compelling and non-trivial, it is because some of our beliefs, e.g. about 
global economic injustice, are veridical in some culturally neutral sense. That is to say, the 
graphic economic differentials perceived regionally are objective features of the world. 
Surely the strife and disarray labelled ‘underdevelopment’ in Africa, in contrast with affluent 
lifestyles enjoyed by many people in G-8 countries, are not culturally constructed figments of 
varying perceptual judgement; otherwise there would be nothing morally objectionable with 
encouraging an individual who experiences egregious economic stress simply to 
reconceptualise his glass as half full. 
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On the other hand, it is a commonplace that people’s p rceptions of ‘underdevelopment’ are 
not uniform: people’s sense of being demoralised by poverty is affected by their aspirations 
and their expectations for economic reform. It is another commonplace that such aspirations 
are in turn affected by people’s awareness of alterna ives, through exposure to videos and 
newsfeeds of the easy affluence enjoyed in remote regions of the world (via 
telecommunication satellite, cinema, and now, the Int rnet). Likewise, people in affluent 
societies reflecting upon unfamiliar economic conditions abroad are influenced by 
stereotypical media images. Highly technological lifestyles are rife with a range of moral 
injunctions and concomitant beliefs about carbon footprints, fast food, and fast track living, 
all accompaniments of a general climate of large pockets of disposable income. Indeed 
everyone’s judgments about their own and other peoples’ material standards of living are 
shaped in part by upbringing, in part by exposure to a flurry of current opinion and a steady 
flow of conventional aphorisms provided by their own immediate cultural milieus. If 
descriptions of contrast as facile as these are all th t the culture-specificity hypothesis 
amounts to, then the hypothesis is a truism (Williams 1972, 31-33). No one will disagree that 
trends in belief of all sorts within and between cultures and generations are detectable; even 
as one person grows older the phenomenon of time app ars to change for that person. 
Differences in attitude, habit, and expressions used to describe time can be identified as 
‘typical in culture A’ and ‘unprecedented in culture B’. But so what? Spotting trends is a 
great distance from finding evidence that certain metaphysical beliefs borne of one culture 
are not available for reflection and revisable from within another. 
 
On a somewhat stronger, non-trivial interpretation, the culture-specificity hypothesis seems to 
suggest that the rift between African and Western metaphysical beliefs poses some difficulty 
to be overcome for those whose cultural background poorly prepares them for an orientation 
to time that originates in cultures where the pressures of twenty-first century post-industrial 
economics are taken in stride. But on a careful reading, if the hypothesis suggests that there is 
some kind of problem for individuals who are culturally divided from the concepts needed to 
improve their economic condition, then the solution lies in the very expression of the 
problem. For in order to avoid incoherence, the culture-specificity hypothesis’ truth 
presupposes that a background framework of shared concepts about time must be accessible 
from all the cultural vantage points within the scope of reference denoted by the hypothesis. 
The following paragraph explains why. 
 
African and non-African time: to contrast or not to contrast? The geo-political convenience of dichotomization 15 
 15
Suppose that my concept of time learned in my culture A cannot be recognized by anyone 
else whose different concept of time was inherited in another culture B. Suppose further that 
the culture-specificity of beliefs is interpreted to mean that no one can understand time as it is 
comprehended in cultures other than their own. Then neither of us could make sense of any 
elaboration of the culture-specific differences between timeA and timeB orientations, since 
according to this radical relativist interpretation neither of us can understand any view of time 
other than our own. In that case there is no telling whether the proposed contrast has been 
accurately portrayed or indeed whether it actually exists at all. What could decide whether 
my beliefs about timeA were different from someone’s beliefs in culture B except our both 
witnessing a contrast emerging in the descriptions f time offered to depict both our views? 
How could anyone verify whether the rendering of our conceptual differences has been 
accurately portrayed? If we can understand the culture-specificity hypothesis on such a strict 
interpretation, then it cannot be true. If it were true, then we shouldn’t be able to understand 
it. Hence the very articulation of cultural polarities presupposes a cross-cultural medium of 
description which undermines the claim that one pole f the contrast is inaccessible to 
adherents of the other (Davidson 1984, 184; Lauer 2007c). 
 
This analysis highlights an important fact which is inherent in the very existence of cross-
cultural contrasts, and one that we will elaborate in the next section; viz. that culture-
participants are able to appreciate contrasts between alternative views of time and to form 
evaluative opinions about them. This defeats the proposal that adherents at one pole of a 
cultural dichotomy are somehow incapable of appropriating by their own accord the 
conceptual apparatus that is endemic to adherents at the other pole. The formulation of the 
culture-specificity hypothesis presupposes that indiv duals who comprehend it are neither 
prohibited nor indisposed by any a priori or logical force, nor by any inherent limitation 
peculiar to their cultural heritage, to think any number of ways about the future. To avoid 
self-refutation, the culture-specificity hypothesis implies that we need not be stuck or driven 
to hold our culturally inherited beliefs about time, insofar as we can create or become aware 
of existing alternatives. This is unobjectionable, unless one wants to presume that culturally 
determined beliefs about time in some way have inhib ted Africans from accessing the 
conceptual tools required for economic development to take off. That cannot be the case, if 
the culture-specificity hypothesis is not going to collapse into self-refutation. This is why it 
seems that the two corollaries, the causal hypothesis and culture-specificity of beliefs about 
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time discussed in §2 and here in §3 cannot both be asserted consistently in any non-trivial 
way. 
 
From the considerations canvassed in this section, we can conclude that: 
(a) Culture specificity of beliefs about time presupposes some culturally neutral standpoint 
from which the thesis can be understood. 
 
(b) There is no a priori basis for regarding one standpoint as an advanced vehicle for coping 
with modernity—that is, not unless individuals who are inviting new technology 
transfers and other precedents have the authority t draw relevant conclusions. In this 
respect, perhaps, the evaluation of contrasting beliefs about time must be culture-
specific, rather than the beliefs themselves. We will d ell more on this point in the 
next and the last sections. 
 
(c) Individuals who are so inclined must be able in pri ciple to identify the full range of 
contrasts between their respective views of time and development. Our analysis 
suggests there is no reason to doubt that people can come to self-realisation about 
their concepts of time on their own initiative: If one was brought up with timeB, 
realising a new sense of timeA need not be something imposed from outside. This run
contrary to Mbiti’s suggestion that the evolution of modern temporality in Africa 
depended upon colonial missionaries and their Christian teachings (1969, 27) and his 
expectation that accommodation of one indigenous African time orientation to a 
different Western one “will not be smooth” (1969, 28). In fact there seems little 
reason to think we can predict how thinking about time will impact upon perceptions 
of development in future. 
 
So far, it has emerged that depending upon how radically we interpret the cultural relativity 
of metaphysical beliefs in contrast with culturally neutral perceptual beliefs about economic 
development, either the culture-specificity hypothesis appears trivial, or it is self refuting, or 
its implications for the causes of underdevelopment are unremarkable. If the culture-
specificity hypothesis is withdrawn altogether, then its corollary, the causal hypothesis, 
appears implausible by virtue of the many everyday considerations ready to hand that 
contradict it. We will review some of these next in section §4. 
 
§4. Reassessing cross-cultural interpretations of time 
In sections §2 and §3 we have considered two main hypot eses that jointly promote 
idiosyncrasies in African metaphysical thought as cusally responsible for shortfalls in 
African economic practice. But on closer examination of these hypotheses, the obstacles to 
economic development purported to be characteristic of ‘African’ beliefs about time seem to 
be not so much about the beliefs themselves, as in the way they are assessed. 
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In general people seem far less rigid in their orientations to widely disparate influences of 
diverse cultural traditions than the theorists appeling to cultural determinism would have one 
believe. Individual experiences of time are evidently not simply an extension of a pre-
formulated, densely knitted fabric of beliefs inherited genetically or linguistically that resists 
revision or expansion except through re-indoctrination. Cultural syntheses are in fact as 
commonplace as the phenomenon of borrowing vocabulary between languages. Perhaps time 
is no more a fixed cultural construction than is language. Syntactic features of a language can 
remain invariant with minor exceptions, while semantic content undergoes a continuous, fluid 
transformation. It is a philosopher’s fiction that belief-systems are limited by distinct 
languages rendering different cultural outlooks incommensurable with one another the world 
over. 
 
On the contrary, empirical evidence readily indicates hat citizens of post- and neo-colonial 
West and East African cultures acquire a wide repertoir  of complementary time orientations, 
each adaptable to suit different social contexts and demands, analogously to code-switching 
in language. For instance in cosmopolitan centres of Ghana and Nigeria, generations of 
individuals have been adapting to rival orientations towards work and worship, family 
structure and obligation, entertainment, legal and health care systems, land tenure and 
political protocols (Lauer 2007b). Functioning in more than one conceptual scheme has been 
a successful tactic of assimilation and eventual dismissal of a foreign military presence.  
There is nothing very extraordinary to Ghanaian or Nigerian cultures in this bifocal ability to 
succeed by absorption of apparently conflicting conceptual schemes—including contrary 
attitudes towards keeping appointments and being punctilious in the uses of time.  This 
bifocal ability defeats any attempt to state in Ghana or Nigeria where ‘traditional’ thought 
leaves off and ‘modernity’ begins. Celebrated men of letters who have mastered a creative 
and inspiring composition of both include Anthony Kwame Appiah (1992), Odera Oruka 
(1990), Kwasi Wiredu (1980), Ngugi wa Thiong'o (198) and a host of others. 
 
These are all remarkable individuals; each is a model of legendary cosmopolitanism 
reflecting literary ingenuity and heroism. But in principle there seems no reason to suppose 
that, if given the opportunity, the majority of people show a reluctance to adapt to dramatic 
changes in their social and material circumstances, and are thereby reflecting a metaphysical 
rigidity or cognitive insularity peculiar to African cultures. It is mistaken to attribute 
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someone’s resisting a change to some deep-seated conceptual orientation. A person’s 
reluctance or readiness to embrace technological chnge will depend not upon her 
metaphysical beliefs but upon the favourableness and feasibility of the change, as well as the 
flexibility of her position in the prevailing social structure. For some people, some changes 
are just not as helpful as they might seem to others unfamiliar with their circumstances. A 
famous example is that of initiating a water pump smack in the centre of a village, thereby 
disrupting the opportunities for socially condoned courtship (Stamp 1989). For the young 
women whose job it is to collect water, the pump is no match for the advantage of making 
mandatory lengthy treks away from the village to fetch water daily. In general, it is unclear 
how the metaphysics of an intellectual heritage can determine whether or not an individual 
will be disposed to accept a technological change wholesale. Acceptance of a new practice or 
technology will depend upon the particular circumstances and consequences of the change in 
each specific case. 
 
Concerning the future acceptance of a new phenomenology of time best suited for a new 
economic order: we may conclude that many aspects of temporal experience are likely to be 
accessible to most adults regardless of cultural background or national identity, once they set 
about considering these aspects of immediate experience to the exclusion of everything else. 
There is no basis for regarding any one of these perspectives as an advance over any other, 
unless the advantages of contrasting concepts of time are weighed up within a broader 
evaluation of industrialization and technology transfer, conducted from the point of view of 
the individuals newly inviting these innovations. It seems patently obvious that there is really 
no other way to analyse productively the human value of economic change. 
 
In this section it has been established that, in prciple, culture-participants regardless of 
origin are quite capable of adopting new skills to accommodate the pressures imposed by 
modern technology, or its absence, and rapidly changing economic conditions through the 
processes and international dynamics now called globalisation. In the next and final section 
(§5), I will review the obstructions to economic development that arise in part from non-
Africans’ failure to grasp post-colonial norms in the uses of time as maximally rational 
responses to local and global conditions. Conventions in the management of time in 
contemporary Africa are inseparable components of a social structure that is well suited and 
long established in dealing with severely debilitatng material circumstances, hegemony, and 
outwardly directed economic planning. 
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§5. The geo-political context of African philosophical activity 
It is always suspect to advance the thesis that a given discourse is not really about what it 
seems to be about, or that a statement means something quite different from what it appears 
to mean. On the other hand, it is a truism that professional academics work at justifying the 
status quo, at least as often as they articulate motivati ns for advocating progressive social 
change (Gramsci 1977). Through an international collab ration of symposia, such as the kind 
described at the outset of this paper, philosophers may collectively refine an intercultural 
construct called an ‘African’ concept of time for the purpose of building a theory that 
conveniently diffuses, subdues and redirects the awkw rd responses of outrage and derision 
elicited by revelation of the facts about global development partnerships, policies and their 
debilitating effects. A further step towards redress might be taken by staging a new set of 
philosophical questions for a third intercultural symposium—not about African concepts of 
time, but about its management in the context of today’s international development politics. 
Among such questions might be: 
• Who interprets the needs of a nation? 
• Who is at liberty to dictate the pace and direction of economic development or to 
contest the local desirability or feasibility of a policy? 
• Whose interpretation of phenomena counts as authoritative? 
• Whose point of view sets the norm for what counts as rational and decisive? 
 
Answers to the questions above are inseparable fromc ncerns about how to reinforce the 
neo-colonial recuperation process. It is anachronistic to point out that under the current terms 
of international aid and trade, the immediate experience of the African most dramatically 
affected by development projects is not central - neither is the African’s health, nor his 
priorities, nor her educational advance, nor his comfort, her ambitions nor his talents. Again, 
it is anachronistic to comment that whatever way inter ational development problems may be 
defined or understood theoretically, in practice thir solutions surely involve restructuring the 
balance of power in relations that were initially established cross culturally at the initiative of 
non-Africans through military protocols. Under current conditions that sustain egregious 
cross-cultural economic disparity, philosophical investigation of the African’s experience of 
time might also be interpreted as an artifice for deflecting attention from the egregious need 
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to relocate the voice of authority and executive power over the determination of Africa’s 
future economic reforms within the cultures of Africa themselves. Reflecting and deliberating 
on the a-historical implications of contrasting beliefs about time is a dim spotlight for 
illuminating the residual tensions and conflicted legacy inherent in today’s politics of 
expertise and terms of technological transfer. The significance for Africans of controlling the 
seat of causal efficacy in African economies is not merely rhetorical. 
 
If we want to make sense of positing a link between time as a cultural construction and its 
alleged effects upon development progress or regression, we need to acknowledge that 
explicit talk about time may be a vehicle of indirection or a neutral medium for amplifying 
and contesting the inherent tension in the internatio l relations and policies generic to the 
so-called development process in its historical setting and current dynamic. Dysfunctions are 
standardly regarded as symptomatic of a fundamental resistance or cognitive incapacity, or as 
symptoms of a conceptual conflict between worldviews. Instead, apparent dysfunctions might 
be analysed for their covert practical utility. The patterns of delay, intractable setbacks and 
indecisions, the redistribution of capital wealth under the cloak of corruption and ignominy 
(Ekeh 2012 [1975]), the indeterminacy of accountability and theatrics of administrative 
ineptitude may all function collectively to defeat foreign investors’ sustained control over the 
means of production and investment decisions affecting African social and political 
economics.  
 
We have observed that cross-cultural misunderstanding oes impede substantive progress in 
development plans across Africa. But it is less readily conceded that shortfalls in adaptation 
to technological change often reside with the misinterpretation by foreign experts, both of 
development problems and their solutions. An important result of this critique into cross 
cultural misunderstanding is to highlight the mundae fact that the effectiveness of a solution 
strategy to a development setback varies radically with the circumstances. Further, the 
comprehensive impact of an economic remedy is likely to be apparent only in its immediate 
surroundings, or only to those with knowledge of the political history peculiar to that region. 
More generally, the criteria for determining what counts as a maximally rational choice may 
be inaccessible across vast divides of cultural history and political economics (MacIntyre 
1988). Consequently, some of the models proposed by development experts to achieve 
optimal efficiency are misapplied when relying univocally on concepts of time management 
that suit conditions in G-8 countries. 
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A familiar example of misapplication occurs in development economics when standard game 
theory models are adopted to capture the syntax of rational decision-making. Some 
philosophers over-generalise the parallel between having an intention and formulating an 
activity plan as a linear set of expectations (see e.g. Bratman 1981; Lauer 2013, 20). The 
rationality of engaging in extensive and detailed sequential plans is materially and 
circumstantially dependent, since it presupposes confidence that the desired results are likely 
to emerge. But this expectation is reasonable only if the agent has experienced a substantial 
degree of success in a relatively predictable, low risk environment. If facilities and financial 
resources are quite volatile, then a rational agent will abstain from forming long-term 
predictions, sacrifices, and investments involving protracted delay of returns. The obstacles to 
proceeding with a long-term project in an insecure and impoverished setting are not deep or 
conceptual; they are elementary and practical, problems to which any rational agent will 
respond by suppressing expectations and adopting provisional backup plans instead of long 
term goals. 
 
Time management has always had a very forthright and practical utility for Africans both in 
village court proceedings and in central city boardrooms. In deliberations that enhance 
African economic development, time management will continue to function quite 
pronouncedly, either implicitly or explicitly, in the business of bracketing and sidelining 
hegemony, restaging the balance of power between int rnational partners in capital ventures, 
repositioning the locus of authority over decision making, controlling the extraction of 




What began as a critique of a long-standing controversy about contemporary African thought 
concerning the nature of time has concluded in a reflection on contemporary African 
practices concerning the management of time. This critique has provided both empirical and 
logical evidence for suspecting that a politics of philosophical indirection drives the enduring 
debate about contrasting ‘African’ with ‘Western’ concepts of time which has persisted for 
nearly five decades, since notorious proposals of this kind were first published by John S. 
Mbiti in 1969. 
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Contemporary phenomenologists and social philosophers continue to explore the corollaries 
that African beliefs about time are culturally determined and that these beliefs are causally 
responsible for shortfalls in the way Africans go about enacting and executing economic 
policy. It was shown that these two hypotheses when taken literally are not sustainable: the 
causal hypothesis breaks down because it is not possible to isolate and identify which 
propositional beliefs are the ones responsible for a fecting an agent’s economic conditions. 
And although it is a truism that different ways of describing time vary across language 
communities, the stronger claim that such varied notio s of time are radically 
incommensurable between cultures was shown to be self-refuting. Indeed if that claim were 
strictly true, we should not be able to understand it. On a less extreme reading, the proposal 
that Africans have difficulty grasping and evaluating alternative notions of time was shown to 
be unconvincing. 
 
Yet such claims continue to circulate in philosophical forums. It was suggested in 
consequence that cross cultural shortfalls in understanding the antecedent conditions for 
successful development do exist, but they belong rathe  on the side of non-Africans who fail 
to conceptualise the practical and material demands that compel rational strategies of time 
management in favour of risk avoidance, among other benefits, in situations of uncertainty 
and scarcity. A variety of historically specific considerations account for anomalies of 
economic practice in a neo-colonial environment as well: suppression or diversion of plans 
may function to resist external seizure of resources, both human and natural, to redistribute 
available capital throughout the population, or to sustain a minimum of frustration and 
deprivation in situations of extreme scarcity and ifrastructural inadequacy. These strategies 
remain camouflaged from foreign expertise because they are essentially adversarial to 
transnational business interests (Lauer 2007b). Yet it is uncontroversial to point out that a 
change in priorities driven by a shift in the source of authoritative policy analysis would serve 
as a first step for African national and regional economies to flourish. 
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